INTRODUCTION
For years, individuals have been challenging the noncompetition agreements they entered into with their employers on the basis that the agreements violate public policy.
However, in a competitive marketplace-where every person is out for him or herself and the goal is to maximize profits-courts and legislatures in many jurisdictions are reluctant to invalidate otherwise reasonable noncompetition agreements. After all, companies should have the right to expect that freelynegotiated contract provisions will be enforced.
But what if the noncompetition agreement is entered into between an individual and a nonprofit organization? Should the nonprofit organization have the same right of expectation? For the most part, the courts and legislatures seem to think so. And, perhaps they are right, at least when it comes to the general class of nonprofits and to nonprofits that are protecting their interests against for-profit entities. As for charitable-or § 501(c)(3)-nonprofits that are attempting to protect their interests against other charitable nonprofits, however, the decisionmaking bodies should reconsider their position.
Unlike traditional for-profit entities, whose main goal is profit maximization, charitable nonprofits are organized and operated to benefit some greater good. As a result, charitable nonprofits receive donations from philanthropic individuals and corporations, as well as various tax breaks from the government, which are unavailable to for-profit entities. At the same time, charitable nonprofits exploit many of the same tools that for-profit firms utilize to maximize profits, including noncompetition agreements. Thus, charitable nonprofits are able to benefit from an anti-competition, profit-maximizing tool while also reaping the rewards of their tax-exempt status. In short, charitable nonprofits wrongly enjoy the best of both the for-profit and nonprofit worlds.
Part II of this Article discusses charitable nonprofits, focusing on their unique philanthropic missions and the tax benefits conferred on them by the federal and state governments. Part III provides a general overview of employee noncompetition agreements.
Part IV demonstrates that charitable nonprofits' use of noncompetition agreements is contrary to their missions and tax-exempt statuses, as well as to the public interest, because the noncompetition agreements restrict individuals' abilities to serve society. Moreover, alternative and less intrusive means of protecting an employer's interests exist. Finally, Part IV proposes that Congress should adopt a law rendering unenforceable any language in a noncompetition agreement that would prevent an individual from leaving the employment of one charitable nonprofit for employment at another. 1 1 Taking this argument a step further to state that charitable nonprofits should not be allowed to use noncompetition agreements at all-whether dealing with other charitable nonprofits or for-profit entities-while not the topic of this Article, also may be worth considering. The charitable nonprofits' foray into the for-profit world of competition has some people concerned about the organizations' ability to maintain their mission focus. CRISTIANA CICORIA, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS FACING COMPETITION: THE APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN AND GERMAN COMPETITION LAW TO NOT-FOR- PROFIT ENTITIES 34 (2006) (noting that competition with for-profit firms can "lead nonprofits to adopt business-like practices, and to lose the focus on noncommercial/altruistic missions"); W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION? THE CHALLENGE TO TAX EXEMPTION ix (1988) (stating that some nonprofits have "los [t] sight of the fact that they are, in fact, not for profit"). For example, competition with forprofit firms can lead to commercialization.
See Howard P. Tuckman, Competition, Commercialization, and the Evolution of Nonprofit Organizational Structures, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 175, 177 (1998) . In other words, in order to stay in business, a charitable nonprofit may decide to produce some goods or services for the sole purpose of generating a profit. Id. at 177, 186. Over time, this increase in commercial activity likely will draw the organization's attention away from its chief activities. See id. at 190. Thus, "[t] he challenge for public policy is to insure that . . . the pressures toward commercialization[] do not diminish the unique charitable role of the nonprofit sector." Id. at 176; see also Burton A. Weisbrod, Guest Editor's Introduction: The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 165, 173 (1998) ("At present, public policy is permissive in its regulations as they affect nonprofits' access to commercial markets. But the social disadvantages of having nonprofits act increasingly like private firms are considerable."). When charitable nonprofits lose sight of their mission focus, they should no longer BLANCHARD_CHARITABLENONPROFITS_FORMATTED 7/2/2014 6:38:14 PM
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GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . , and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
5
Thus, to qualify for charitable nonprofit status, an entity must be organized and operated for purposes that benefit the greater good (i.e., it must have a charitable mission), 6 must not distribute profits to those in 5 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2014) . Section 501(c)(3) organizations were originally limited to religious, educational, charitable, and scientific organizations. BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at xxxiii. Those designations comport with early definitions of charity. See id. at xxx ("St. Thomas Aquinas classified the spiritual acts of charity as to counsel, to sustain, to teach, to console, to save, to pardon, and to pray; the corporal acts of charity as to clothe, to give drink to, to feed, to free from prison, to shelter, to assist in sickness, and to bury."). Over the years, Congress added organizations that seek to prevent cruelty to children or animals (1918) , organizations that serve literary purposes (1921) , and organizations that test for public safety (1954) . STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 105, 110 (2008) , www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf ("In order to qualify for tax-exempt status, an organization must show that its purpose serves the public good, as opposed to a private interest."); BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at xxxii-xxxiii (" [I] t is necessary to distinguish between 'charitable' activities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 'noncharitable' activities defined by the Internal Revenue Code as 'nonprofit' and therefore tax-exempt. The latter are of many sorts, with varied purposes that are related to mutuality, self-help, and cooperation or to activities which for special political reasons have been deemed to deserve nonprofit status. . . . [The former are those that engage in] activity that tends toward human betterment."); Hines Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 1181 (stating that § 501(c)(3) "nonprofits must be both organized and operated for specified charitable purposes"); see also id. at 1185 (noting that "state law generally requires nonprofits to identify a charitable mission in their organizing documents and operate in furtherance of that mission"); Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities SelfRegulation: It's Time to End FINRA's Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 139 (2011 ) (citing Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 133 (2006 ) (stating that charitable nonprofits "are established to serve the public interest"); Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 1, 2 ("In the legal sense, charitable organizations include those organizations that help the needy but also include churches, schools, hospitals, and social service organizations, which generally benefit an indefinite class of individuals."). If an entity is not organized and operated exclusively for one or more purposes as listed in § 501(c)(3), it will not be considered exempt. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (West 2012). To satisfy the organizational test, the entity's articles of organization must: (a) [l] imit the purposes of such organization to one or more control of the entity, 7 and must refrain from participating in politics. 8 In addition, common law provides that a charitable organization may not act contrary to established public policy.
9 Satisfaction of these criteria leads to significant tax benefits under federal and state law, 10 including income and property tax exemptions for the organization and its donors' ability to deduct their gifts from their taxable income.
Perhaps the most important of the above-mentioned attributes is the charitable nonprofit's pursuit of a philanthropic mission. Without that feature, an entity foregoes some of the tax benefits accorded charitable nonprofits, most notably the ability to receive tax-deductible gifts.
11
Thus, whether an organization adopts a charitable mission in order to gain favorable tax status, or favorable tax status is a bonus for an exempt purposes; and (b) . . . not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes." Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i). An entity will satisfy the operational test, "only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3)." Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). In general terms, "mission" means "a strongly felt aim, ambition, or calling." 12 In the business context, a "mission" defines the basic reason for an organization's existence.
13
Not only does it describe the organization's core competencies and goals, but it also identifies the company's guiding principles and values.
14 In other words, a mission creates a public image and distinguishes the company from its peers.
15
The presence of a mission is an important tool for organizations because it generates employee unity and commitment 16 and provides a foundation for strategic planning. 17 In fact, entities often put their mission in writing as a formal "mission statement" (sometimes called a "vision statement" nonprofit's persona from its for-profit counterparts; rather, it is the nature of the charitable nonprofit's mission that sets it apart. 20 Compare, for example, the mission statements for PepsiCo and Target Corporation (two for-profit entities) with those of the American Red Cross, Mayo Clinic, and Catholic Charities USA (three charitable nonprofit organizations): PepsiCo Our mission is to be the world's premier consumer products company focused on convenient foods and beverages. We seek to produce financial rewards to investors as we provide opportunities for growth and enrichment to our employees, our business partners and the communities in which we operate. And in everything we do, we strive for honesty, fairness and integrity. Catholic Charities USA The mission of Catholic Charities is to provide service to people in need, to advocate for justice in social structures, and to call the entire church and other people of good will to do the same.
25
While the for-profit entities' mission statements focus on producing topnotch consumer products, providing premium customer service, and maximizing profitability, the charitable nonprofits' mission statements focus on bettering the welfare of society in some particular way. 26 Thus, the charitable nonprofits' mission statements comport with § 501(c)(3) and broadcast the organizations' philanthropic purposes to society at large.
B. FAVORABLE TAX TREATMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS PROVIDED TO CHARITABLE NONPROFITS
The public good-oriented missions pursued by charitable nonprofits play a major role in the nonprofits' survival, providing benefits beyond those provided to for-profit organizations with profit-oriented mission statements. 27 In addition to reaping the managerial benefits discussed above, charitable nonprofits' mission statements also attract donors and draw subsidies from private foundations and government agencies. Charitable nonprofits are even able to save money when purchasing other nonprofit entities that share their mission. 29 Moreover, in exchange for the ability to pursue a worthy cause, employees often are willing to work for lower wages (or to forego wages altogether as volunteers) than they would receive in a comparable position at a for-profit enterprise.
30
The most well-known benefit enjoyed by charitable nonprofits is their favorable tax treatment by both the federal and state governments. 31 Charitable nonprofits have been exempt from federal income taxation since 1894, and they have been exempt from state and local property taxation even longer. While the charitable tax exemption is entrenched in federal law, there is no commonly-accepted explanation for its existence. 37 Historically, tax-based theories were used to justify the exemption.
38
Under such theories, "exemption exists for entities that simply do not have any of what the particular tax system attempts to tax: e.g., no net disposable income or no real property."
39 Over time, the subsidy theory became the dominant explanation. 40 This theory describes the exemption as "an attempt to help those entities that 'do good' for society."
41 Thus, the subsidy theory is said to more accurately explain the tax system because it assumes the organization falls within the ordinary tax base, but "views the entity as deserving of an implicit government subsidy, which 34 COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 8. 35 Simon et al., supra note 4, at 269 (citing I.R.C. § § 3301-11, 4421(2)(b) § 170) . The rationale behind this benefit is that charitable nonprofits "serve broad public purposes which transcend the personal interests of their members and benefactors." BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (citing B. A. Weisbrod, , THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 59-79 (1988) ). Thus, noncharitable nonprofits are not eligible for this benefit. See Simon et al., supra note 4, at 269 ("Contributions of cash or property (but not services) to §501(c)(3) charities generally are tax deductible by individuals and corporations for income tax purposes ( §170) and are also deductible for estate and gift tax purposes ( § §2055, 2522) . Gifts to noncharitable nonprofits generally are not deductible . . . ."); Marilyn E. Phelan, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION § 7.1 (West 2013) ("Rules differ for each of the classifications of tax exempt organizations. Donations to Section 501(c)(3) organizations provide donors with charitable contribution deductions, whereas contributions to the majority of the other tax exempt organizations do not.").
37 COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 4; Orenbach, supra note 6, at 188 (citing Nicholas P.
Cafardi & Jaclyn Fabean Cherry, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 51 (2006) is administered by foregoing the imposition of taxes." 42 According to this theory, the subsidy is appropriate because the government would otherwise have to provide the service. 43 Other proposed theories include the capital subsidy theory (which states that nonprofits should be exempt from taxation of their funds because they are hindered from raising money in the first place by the non-distribution constraint), 44 the public benefit theory (which provides that entities should be subsidized for providing common or social goods and services), 45 and the altruism theory (which provides that exemptions are rewards for selfless behavior).
46
Whatever the rationale, it is clear that charitable nonprofits are reaping significant benefits from the exemptions. In fact, it is estimated that public charities received approximately $14 billion in income tax 42 (discussing "human services" nonprofits in particular) ("Nonprofit boards and executives must walk a fine line between assuring the organization's financial sta success the primary measure of organizational success."). 52 See, e.g., Steinberg & Powell, supra note 6, at 9 ("Nonprofit success is evaluated in terms of mission, rather than a simple bottom line."); Brown & Slivinski, supra note 28, at 140 ("One distinctive feature of nonprofit firms is that they are unlikely to set out simply to maximize profit. They have been granted nonprofit status because of their proclaimed public purpose, and have foresworn the opportunity to distribute profits to owners."); CICORIA, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that nonprofits "represent the 'good society', and they embody the 'caring tradition' of values and social commitment that seem to have been overwhelmed by the profit motive"); see also Steinberg & Powell, supra note 6, at 9 ("Nondistributing organizations are treated differently u re ory laws, amplifying their tendencies to depart from profit maximization."). 53 See CICORIA, supra note 1, at 46 ("Nonprofit organizations can, similarly to commercial enterprises, aggressively seek profits to finance expansion or product development, but their main goal is to better fulfill beneficiaries ['] and donors ['] expectations through an increased production of social services and goods. In other words, nonprofit organizations, instead of maximizing profits, maximize the socially beneficial/charitable output."). Thus, while both for-profits and nonprofits must make profits to survive, the difference lies in what the entities can do with those profits. See BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. Profits earned by nonprofit organizations must either be "retained (as endowment, reserves, or temporarily restricted funds), reinvested (in organizational expansion or the provision of charitable services), or given to other nonprofit organizations (as grants)." charitable nonprofits may find themselves engaged in competition for profits with a variety of players. 54 While they sometimes compete with for-profit and nonprofit entities for customer-generated profits (by offering a superior or cheaper service-i.e., "traditional" competition), 55 they also receive a large portion of their revenue from donations and grants available only to other nonprofits.
56
Competition for these resources is much different because the charitable nonprofits' success depends greatly upon their commitment to their mission 57 rather than solely on the attributes of the services rendered. In this respect, charitable nonprofits engage in non-traditional competition.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
In the employment context, a covenant not to compete-or noncompetition agreement-is a promise by an employee not to engage in the same type of business as his or her employer in a given area for a certain amount of time after the employment relationship ends.
58
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 118 (citing Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 7); Arnsberger et al., supra note 6, at 113 ("Even though they are considered nonprofit, public charities use net income, the difference between total revenue and total expenses, to expand future programs competition from competition among for-profit firms is the lack of self-interested motives."); see also id. at 33 (discussing Howard Tuckman's analysis of nonprofits' behavior in a competitive market and stating that, in regard to donors, "reputation and effectiveness in complying with the socially beneficial task are considered to be the most useful weapons against other competitors"); Tuckman, supra note 1, at 178 ("Donations to nonprofits are determined, in part, by the value donors place on their services; nonprofits with highly valued missions offering services in scarce supply (relative to demand) may find fund-raising easier than do those with less highly valued missions." Variations of noncompetition agreements have been in existence since mediaeval times, 59 and they serve important and useful purposes in a marketplace otherwise guided by principles of free competition. One longstanding purpose is to prevent employees from learning their employers' secrets only to leave and set up a competing business in the employers' backyard. 60 And, as employee mobility continues to increase, employers are using these agreements to prevent employees from taking confidential information learned during their tenure to a new job with a competitor.
61
Given the apparent benefits conferred by noncompetition agreements, and the principle of freedom of contract 62 upon which American society is based, 63 some would argue that noncompetition agreements should be enforced as long as they are entered into by 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) , modified on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)); see Hutter, supra note 58, at 311-12 (discussing employers' use of noncompetition agreements to prevent serious monetary losses resulting from the transfer of confidential business information to a competitor). Covenants not to compete also have long been used in conjunction with the sale of a business. See Charles E. Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 245 (1928) ("[T] he English courts early supported agreements not to compete where they were part of a sale of property or a business, and were appropriate as a protection of the property or business retained or sold . . . ."). In that instance, the function of the covenant is to maintain honesty and protect business' goodwill by preventing a person from selling his business to an innocent buyer only to turn around and open a rival business across the street. See Jones, supra note 59, at 921 (citing Addyston, 85 Fed. at 280). 61 And, employees have been challenging their noncompetition agreements on those grounds for centuries.
66 Under fifteenth-century English common law, for example, covenants not to compete were determined to be wholly unlawful because they "might have the effect of making [the obligor] and his family a charge upon the community as well as depriving the community of the benefit of his competition." 67 Similarly, in one early United States case, a state court enumerated several reasons for finding noncompetition agreements to be inherently unreasonable, including that they diminish the ability of a person to procure a livelihood, deprive the public of services by those most capable of rendering them, discourage enterprise, and hinder competition. Over time, "as business developed and the value of good will became understood, as individual freedom of movement and action was secured, and as corporations became factors in trade and commerce," courts began using a reasonableness test to determine whether a particular noncompetition agreement was valid.
69 There are two main considerations under this test:
[F]irst, it is necessary to decide whether the non-competition agreement is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate needs of the employer; and second, whether the non-competition agreement is reasonable with respect to the nature of the temporal and geographic restraints and the activity proscribed.
70
Courts also will look to the effect of the agreement on the public interest.
71 Thus, the courts began to balance the competing policies. 72 A power and need protection to ensure their ability to pursue a chosen livelihood and mobility."); Long, supra note 64, at 1304-05 (discussing concerns that employment noncompetition agreements are anticompetitive, affect workers' livelihoods, allow employers to exploit the disparity in bargaining power, and deprive society of individuals' productivity). But see Callahan, supra note 64, at 706-07, 712-25 (arguing that the notions that noncompetition agreements are anticompetitive, unfair, and harmful to society lack merit). 69 Jones, supra note 59, at 921; see Hutter, supra note 58, at 318 (discussing the English courts' "balancing of interests standard" and its adoption and articulation by the American courts "as a standard of 'reasonableness'" (citations omitted)). 70 CONTRACTS § 515 (1932) ). But see Blake, supra note 58, at 686 ("[T]he recognized method of decision is that of balancing the employer's claims to protection against the burden on the employee. Once the judgment is made, almost never does a court proceed to consider possible injury to society as a separate matter. This is not surprising, for the balancing process engaged in will almost always result in maximizing the social values as well as those of the parties." Under the first prong of the reasonableness test, a court will examine whether the employer has "a real need for protection." 74 Accordingly, where an employee had access to the employer's trade secrets or confidential customer information, or where the employee built close, exclusive relationships with customers, courts often will find that an employer has a legitimate need for protection. 75 On the other hand, a bare desire to discourage an employee from changing jobs so as not to lose the employer's investment in training, or an attempt to prevent competition by an individual who has acquired general knowledge and skills at the employer's expense, generally is insufficient.
76
Under the second prong of the reasonableness test, a court will determine whether the scope of the noncompetition agreement is broader than necessary-in terms of time, territory, and subject matter-to protect the employer's legitimate interests. 77 For example, an agreement is considered reasonable in terms of temporal scope for the useful life of the claimed trade secrets or for the amount of time necessary for the employer to train a new employee and acquaint him or her with the omitted) ("In short, the problem encountered is a three way balancing of the equities. The employer needs insurance against unfair competition which must not be obtained at the expense of the public who is entitled to the employees' industry and services nor at the expense of the employee who must be able to pursue his calling and earn a livelihood."). 73 As for geographic scope, a restraint must not extend beyond the area in which the employer does business or the employee contacted customers-i.e., "the area in which the employer could suffer economic harm from the employee's activities." 79 In the Internet Age, and in our increasingly global economy, however, courts will not necessarily strike down a noncompetition agreement for lack of a territorial restriction and will permit national and global restrictions in appropriate cases. 80 Finally, a noncompetition agreement may only restrain an employee from performing the same type of activities for a competitor that the employee performed for the employer, or from contacting parties who were customers of the employer during the employee's tenure.
81
While a noncompetition agreement's effect on the public interest traditionally played a small role in the reasonableness test, the weight accorded to this factor has grown.
82
Today, courts will consider society's interests in competition and in an employer's ability to trust its employees, 83 as well as society's need for a particular employee's services. 84 Thus, should an agreement cause the removal of a productive 78 See Blake, supra note 58, at 677-78; Hutter, supra note 58, at 332-35. 79 Hutter, supra note 58, at 329-32; see Lester, supra note 58, at 56-57 (citations omitted) ("As for geography, courts focus on whether the restraint exceeds the geographic area or territory in which the employee formerly worked, or where the employer conducted its business."). 80 See Hutter, supra note 58, at 329-31 (discussing how the "old view that any territorial restraint covering an entire state or the nation is per se unreasonable is no longer valid"); Stone, supra note 59, at 741 ("What a court considers to be reasonable duration and geographic scope varies from state to state and case to case. . . . Recently, some courts have upheld covenants that are wider in geographic scope than those they would have affirmed in the past on the grounds that the firm seeking to enforce the covenant competes in a nationwide or worldwide market."); LORD, supra note 58, § 13:5 (stating that a covenant not to compete that is not limited as to geographic scope or that restrains competition within the entire country is not necessarily invalid per se as long as it is limited as to time and is reasonable overall). 81 See Hutter, supra note 58, at 335 (discussing appropriate activity restrictions in noncompetition agreements); Lester, supra note 58, at 57 (citations omitted) ("Some restraints are invalidated because they restrict an unreasonably broad range of vocational activities, although more tailored restraints that simply prevent the employee from dealing with former customers may be deemed reasonable."). 82 See Glick et al., supra note 66, at 372-73 ("In early American common law, the [public interest] factor was not dispositive, merely tipping the scales in favor of either the employer or employee. However, in modern American common law, this factor may be dispositive if the restriction may harm the public."). 83 Grody, supra note 62, at 187-88. 84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (1981) ; Grody, supra note 62, at 187-88 (stating that the public interest favors "maintenance of adequate supplies of services[] and full use of labor resources").
and necessary employee from society, the injury to the public may be too great.
85
The validity of noncompetition agreements and the ability to enter into such covenants in the United States are governed at the state level by the common law standards articulated above 86 or by statute, depending upon the jurisdiction.
87
Even in most of those states with statutes, 85 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (1981) ("[T] he likely injury to the public may be too great if it is seriously harmed by the impairment of [the employee's] economic mobility or by the unavailability of the skills developed in his employment."). But see Kreider, supra note 73, at 19 ("In actuality, all restraints are bound to have a harmful effect on the public, since by limiting the mobility and supply of labor and the spread of business skills and information, they interfere with operation of the competitive economy . . . . Therefore, to present a problem to the enforceability of an employment contract which was otherwise valid, it would appear that some special injury to the public would have to be present."). 
III. FEDERAL LAW SHOULD RENDER UNENFORCEABLE NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS PREVENTING EMPLOYEE MOBILITY BETWEEN CHARITABLE NONPROFITS
As discussed above, the law governing noncompetition agreements has slowly evolved to deal with modern society's increasingly global and mobile marketplace. In turn, academics have suggested additional reformation to ensure the law truly keeps pace with reality. For example, one scholar, Norman D. Bishara, has advocated for enforcement of noncompetition agreements based on the public policy implications of the nature of the employee's status as either a "creative" or "service" employee.
91
Professor Bishara argued that covenants not to compete should not be enforced against "creative" workers, who develop products, because innovation should be encouraged.
92 But, he argued, covenants not to compete should be enforced against "service" workers, who use their skills and the developed products to render services, because a company's interest in confidentiality and client development should be respected. 93 However, rather than enforcing-or refusing to enforce-noncompetition agreements based on the nature of the employee or based solely on the public policy concerns discussed earlier, 94 this Article proposes a distinction based on the nature of the employer: To the extent noncompetition agreements are used to prevent an employee of one charitable nonprofit from leaving and working for another charitable nonprofit, the agreements should be considered unenforceable. A federal mandate is necessary to effectively implement this rule on a national scale. 91 See Bishara, supra note 68, at 293 (" [T] here are consistent, common implications for categorizing workers in an information economy as 'service' or 'creative' employees for [covenants not to compete] . . . [and] It is inappropriate and unnecessary for a charitable nonprofit to prevent an employee from leaving to work for another charitable nonprofit for two main reasons. First, noncompetition agreements are contrary to charitable nonprofits' missions of furthering society's best interests, and use of such agreements contravenes the reasons for granting those organizations tax-exempt status in the first place. Moreover, as a result of their missions and tax-exempt status, charitable nonprofits do not engage in "traditional" competition and, therefore, should not be allowed to use traditional profit-maximizing tools to their advantage. Second, there exist equally effective, alternative methods of protecting a charitable nonprofit's legitimate business interests.
Noncompetition agreements are contrary to the mission and taxexempt status of the charitable nonprofit organization
While the use of noncompetition agreements to prevent employee mobility often is aligned with the for-profit mission of increasing revenue and rewarding shareholders, use of those agreements is directly contrary to the charitable nonprofit's mission of bettering society.
95
Recall the mission statements of the charitable nonprofits listed above, through which the organizations pledged, among other things, to "provide relief to victims of disaster," "to contribute to health and well- REV. 205, 207 (2007) (discussing an observation made by Steve Pratt, a law firm partner, that a community-based hospital's use of noncompetition agreements with its physicians "is somewhat inconsistent with the theory that underlies the nonprofit community-based hospitals-to serve the community."). One recent case dealt with a similar argument. In Healthcare Services of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, two individuals had signed noncompetition agreements with their former employer, a not-for-profit corporation. 198 S.W.3d 604, 607, 614 (Mo. 2006) . In the agreements, the individuals promised not to engage in a competitive business within a 100-mile radius for a period of two years following the end of their employment. See id. at 607-08. Within days of leaving their employment, the individuals accepted jobs at a competing for-profit business. See id. at 608. The former employees argued that "the noncompete agreements [we] re not enforceable as a matter of public policy because [the former employer] [wa]s a not-for-profit corporation and [w]as not entitled to 'restrain trade in the conduct of charitable activities.'" Id. at 614. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument on the grounds that nonprofit and for-profit entities have the same corporate powers and equally-protectable business interests, stating that the only difference was what the entities did with their earnings. See id. Contrary to the argument in this Article, however, the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in that case dealt only with a nonprofit's right to use noncompetition agreements to protect itself from unfair competition by for-profit competitors.
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being," and "to provide service to people in need."
96
Society is the ultimate benefactor of those organizations' services. Now consider, for example, an individual whose employment at such an entity has ended due to organizational restructuring, but who is prevented by virtue of a noncompetition agreement from utilizing his or her expertise and joining the staff of a similar charitable organization. 97 In that situation-and in countless other loss-of-employment situations-the result is a net loss to society.
Not only might enforcement of a noncompetition agreement in such situations cause an outcome that conflicts with the charitable nonprofits' purposes, but the action of requiring an individual to sign a noncompetition agreement itself might cause the same conflict with the charitable nonprofits' purposes.
Knowing that a noncompetition agreement will limit the options available to an employee upon leaving the employer (and, therefore, that it will effectively limit the employee's ability to quit), an individual may decide not to join an organization where his or her skills and compassion would be utilized to serve society in the first place, if signing a noncompetition agreement is a requirement of employment.
98
Again, this results in a net loss to society and is directly contrary to the typical charitable nonprofit's mission.
Because the altruistic mission is intrinsically tied to the charitable nonprofit's characterization as a § 501(c)(3) organization, the use of noncompetition agreements also is in direct conflict with the charitable nonprofit's tax-exempt status. As discussed above, in order to qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organization, an entity must be "organized and operated exclusively" for a charitable purpose. As noted by two prominent scholars, "there are important differences in how most nonprofits function as compared with for-profit activities. The difference lies in . . . the reasons why a service is offered-to benefit the individual and the community, not to make a profit."
99 Thus, employing a business tactic 96 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 97 This example is not based on specific, real-life events, and the author has no information as to whether the organizations whose mission statements are referenced herein utilize noncompetition agreements. 98 See Bishara, supra note 68, at 289 ("While there is little empirical research on the use of noncompetes, there are indications that such agreements are increasingly common and as a result this sort of post-employment restriction will influence the decisions of employers and employees."); Cynthia L. REV. 379, 407 (2006 REV. 379, 407 ( -2007 ("But perhaps the most troubling effect of non-compete covenants is that, by limiting what the employee can do after leaving the job, they also burden the ability to quit, and with it the ability to demand better wages and working conditions and to resist oppressive conditions in the current job."). 99 WELLFORD & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at ix-x. GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 that places the organization's financial interests above society's interests should raise a red flag for the Internal Revenue Service.
100
Moreover, per their § 501(c)(3) status, charitable nonprofits already receive advantages that for-profit entities-and even other categories of nonprofit entities-do not, such as exemptions from federal income tax and their donors' ability to deduct charitable contributions.
101
As discussed above, these allowances cause charitable nonprofits to engage in a different type of competition depending upon the type of competitor they face. Charitable nonprofits engage in traditional competition (i.e., for customers) with their for-profit counterparts, but in non-traditional competition (i.e., for donors, grants, and customers) with other charitable nonprofits. Thus, because charitable organizations are engaged in nontraditional competition with each other, they should not be allowed to use noncompetition agreements-traditional, profit-maximizing tools of competition-to their advantage. . . and especially in the area of taxation, there is a good case for discriminating among different types of nonprofits according to the functions they serve, and in particular for being more discriminating than in the past by granting exemption only to organizations that are truly charitable."); Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 5, at 822 (" [T] here is a good argument for removing the exemption from commercial nonprofits that are anachronistic or opportunistic."). But see Wexford Med. Grp. v. City of Cadillac, 713 N.W.2d 734, 748 (Mich. 2006) (finding that an entity's use of noncompetition agreements was not sufficient to cause it to lose its charitable status). For example, "[a] nonprofit hospital's decision to adopt a policy to restrict or eliminate competition by medical staff members may affect the hospital's status as a charitable organization." Weeks, supra, at 282. Employing such policies "has the appearance of placing the financial bottom-line of the hospital-and, accordingly, the benefit of hospital administrators and shareholders-above charitable purposes," and could "cause the IRS to question whether the hospital is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes." Id. at 283; see Kinney, supra note 94, at 207 ("While [nonprofit community-based] hospitals have an obligation to remain financially healthy, tying up physicians with non-competes in a way that is good for the hospital but not good for the community is inconsistent with the theory of tax-exempt organizations."). 101 See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. 102 While this Article does not propose that charitable nonprofits should be prohibited from using noncompetition agreements to prevent their employees from leaving to work for a for-profit competitor, an argument for such a proposition exists because the tax breaks charitable nonprofits receive per their § 501(c)(3) status already serve as a buffer against competition. See Tuckman, supra note 1, at 187 (stating that " [t] he subsidies that 501(c)(3) organizations receive offer some cushion against competition"); Rudnick, supra note 9, at 326 ("Tax exemptions give nonprofits a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations.").
Charitable nonprofits can use alternative means to protect their legitimate business interests
This Article does not propose that charitable nonprofits should be left defenseless when it comes to protecting their trade secrets and confidential client information. Rather, it suggests that charitable nonprofits can effectively protect those interests by use of mechanisms that are less onerous than noncompetition agreements, including the law of unfair competition, confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements, nonsolicitation agreements, and incentive-based policies. 103 While, in some ways, these tools may not be as iron-clad or easy to enforce as noncompetition agreements, 104 they are better-suited to the nature of the charitable nonprofit and will adequately protect an organization's legitimate business interests.
First, an employer may protect its confidential information by invoking the law of unfair competition, which prohibits the misappropriation of trade secrets, against a former employee. 105 To establish a valid claim, an employer must show that the information it seeks to protect is a trade secret (i.e., that it is commercially valuable because it is not generally known or readily ascertainable to others, and that it is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy) and that the former employee has improperly acquired, disclosed, or used the trade secret or has threatened to do so. 106 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 competition has its downsides: disclosure may seem unavoidable when the former employee is engaging in a similar occupation, and the necessary evidence of misconduct often is hard to come by. 107 However, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure allows courts to provide an injunction against competition even in the absence of actual misappropriation where an employer can demonstrate that a former employee "will necessarily disclose" a particular trade secret learned from the employer in the course of the new employment.
108 Thus, a cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets provides a viable alternative to a noncompetition agreement. § § 51:143-51:1439 § § 51:143-51: (West 2011 ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § § 1541-1548 (2011) ; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § § 11-1201 § § 11- to 11-1209 § § 11- (West 2012 ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § § 445.1901 § § 445. -445.1910 § § 445. (West 2012 ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 325C.01-325C.08 (West 2012) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § § 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (West 2011) ; MO. ANN. STAT. § § 417.450-417.467 (West 2012) ; MONT. CODE ANN. § § 30-14-401 to 30-14-409 § § 40-24-101 to 40-24-110 (West 2012) . The elements are similar at common law. See Hutter, supra note 58, at 314 (citing 1 R. MILGRAM, TRADE SECRETS § 3.02 (1979) ("[T] he courts are in general agreement that liability [for trade secret misappropriation] requires proof of two essential elements: that the information qualifies as a trade secret and that the ex-employee is using or threatens to use the trade secret to the ex-employer's detriment."). 107 See Hutter, supra note 58, at 314-15 (discussing the pitfalls of relying on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim for protection, including the burden of demonstrating that use or disclosure has occurred or is imminent); see also id. at 317 ("To be sure, the employer must establish the 'reasonableness' of the non-competition agreement, but this burden is usually less difficult than the burden of establishing actual or imminent use.") (citations omitted); Grody, supra note 62, at 184 ("The law of unfair competition might afford some protection . . . . A written agreement, however, gives the employer access to a more favorable body of law and is likely to entitle him to somewhat broader relief than may otherwise be obtainable."). Another concern is that, "even if the employer discovers misappropriation and pursues legal redress, Employer 's Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 166, 168 (2004) . " [T] he doctrine prohibits employees from using or disclosing any trade secrets of a former employer, [but] does not prevent employees from using any skills or general knowledge that they acquired through their work experience." Id. at 166-67. Not all jurisdictions recognize this doctrine, and others require a showing of bad faith on the part of the former employee or irreparable harm to the employer in addition to a demonstration of inevitable disclosure. Id. at 173, 176-77.
Second, instead of limiting where and for whom an individual can work, an employer can limit the information the individual can use in his or her future employment through a confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement.
109
These agreements typically prevent former employees from using or disclosing to a competitor specific, confidential information obtained during their employment.
110
While there are several problems with nondisclosure agreements (e.g., they may be somewhat difficult to enforce because an employer will not be able to monitor its former employees' communications with a new employer, 111 it may be difficult to specify with particularity at the outset of employment the information that should be deemed confidential, 112 and the employer would rather prevent the disclosure from occurring altogether rather than simply have a remedy for it after-the-fact 113 ), these agreements are preferable to noncompetition agreements because they are more narrowly-tailored to the employer's legitimate business interests. Furthermore, enforcing nondisclosure agreements is more efficient for employers than seeking recourse through unfair competition law because the information at issue need not satisfy the legal definition of a trade secret, 114 and these agreements are longer-lasting than 109 See Hutter, supra note 58, at 315-16; Stone, supra note 59, at 738. In addition, "the nature of the employment relationship [generally] imposes an implied duty on agents and employees to protect the employer's trade secrets and other confidential information, which has often been held to survive the termination of the employment relationship." LORD, supra note 58, § § 54:31-54:32 (citations omitted) . Of course, the better practice is to express the duty in writing in a confidentiality agreement. 110 Hutter, supra note 58, at 315-16; Blake, supra note 58, at 669; Stone, supra note 59, at 738; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "nondisclosure agreement" as " [a] contract or contractual provision containing a person's promise not to disclose any information shared by or discovered from a trade-secret holder, including all information about trade secrets, procedures, or other internal matters."). 111 See Wetzel, supra note 71, at 65-66 (citations omitted) ("If an employee has been in a position to learn his employer's trade secrets, a covenant not to compete provides greater assurance that such secrets will not be disclosed than does a mere covenant not to disclose, which may be difficult to enforce."); Blake, supra note 58, at 690 (stating that "that there [may] be no practical way to police whether or not a former employee is violating the covenant"). 112 Blake, supra note 58, at 669. 113 Id. ("[T] he important thing to the employer is not having a cause of action in case of a breach of confidence, but preventing the violation from occurring. An injunction not to disclose can seldom undo or effectively prevent the doing of the real damage."). 114 See Barrick, supra note 72, at 77 (quoting R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 3.02(1)(d) (1967) ("Since it is infrequently difficult to determine whether a certain class of information qualifies as a trade secret, it appears desirable to protect by contract classes of information and data that, individually or collectively, might constitute a trade secret. A court need not determine that such information or data is a trade secret, but rather only that the covenant to protect it was reasonable.'")). GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 noncompetition agreements because they typically are enforceable as long as the information remains confidential.
115
Third, an employer can use a nonsolicitation agreement to protect its customer relations. This type of agreement is a covenant by an individual to not solicit his or her former employer's clientele after termination of employment. 116 In the case of the charitable nonprofit, the key "clients" are the donors; the individuals who actually utilize the organization's services are not as likely to follow a departed employee because they may be utilizing the organization's services out of necessity rather than loyalty to a particular employee. While an employer risks souring its existing client relationships by enforcing nonsolicitation agreements, 117 these agreements-like nondisclosure agreements-are much more narrowly-tailored to the employer's legitimate business interests and are less onerous than noncompetition agreements.
118
Finally, rather than requiring an employee to sign an agreement that prohibits certain behavior upon termination, an employer can provide the employee with incentives to remain with the organization (i.e., offer a carrot rather than wield a stick). In this vein, charitable nonprofits could offer a form of tenure to those employees who have become deeply involved with the company such that they have access to its confidential information or have formed meaningful relationships with donors.
119
Tenure confers a permanent or secure status on an employee by allowing for termination only in rare or extenuating circumstances, such as financial exigency, professional incompetence, illegal activity, or sexual harassment.
120
While tenure sometimes is criticized for removing 115 See Blake, supra note 58, at 689-90; see also LORD, supra note 58, § 54:33. 116 See Blake, supra note 58, at 653-54, 690; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (8th ed. 2004 (defining "nonsolicitation agreement" as " [a] promise, [usually] in . . . an employment contract to refrain, for a specified time, from either (1) enticing employees to leave the company or (2) trying to lure customers away"). Professor Blake describes nonsolicitation agreements as "a narrow form" of noncompetition agreements. Blake, supra note 58, at 657 n.89. 117 Blake, supra note 58, at 657 ("[T]he former employer is not likely to maintain happy relations with a customer who learns that a court order has been obtained which prevents him from receiving an offer from an old business friend."). 118 See Estlund, supra note 98, at 425 (stating that nonsolicitation agreements "impose lower costs on the employee and the public" than noncompetition agreements). 119 Another type of incentive is the use of "golden handcuffs," which means the employer pays an employee to continue working at the organization. Lester, supra note 58, at 51-52. However, "it would be necessary to pay the employee enough to make him indifferent between exploiting the information elsewhere and staying," which may be exorbitant. Id. at 52. Moreover, golden handcuffs often come in the form of stock options, see id., which charitable nonprofits do not use. 120 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1509 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "tenure" as "the legal protection of a long-term relationship, such as employment" and as "[a] status afforded to a teacher or professor as a protection against summary dismissal without sufficient cause"); see also id.
incentives for productivity, 121 it rewards employee loyalty and also results in a more stable workforce for the employer-in other words, both parties benefit. 122 As an added bonus, utilization of a tenure system may entice employees who are deciding between a for-profit entity and its charitable nonprofit counterpart to choose the latter.
123
Many institutions in the education sector, which makes up a large subsection of the charitable nonprofit sector, 124 125 This system, in part, allows the universities to protect their investment in their employees as well as their relationships with donors. To illustrate, consider this cycle of activity: Universities invest money into their faculty members' research and scholarship, through which the faculty members come to be known as experts in their particular field and the university gains recognition. When the university gains recognition, it is likely to draw more donor support, and many faculty members form relationships with the donors. Accordingly, the tenure system allows universities to retain employees who-if they were to leave-might take with them not only their reputation, but possibly also some donors. A similar system could work effectively in other charitable nonprofit organizations, as well.
126 Thus, several equally-and in some instances, more-effective alternatives to the traditional noncompetition agreement exist. 12); Adams, supra note 120, at 81 (stating that "the tenure decision is based principally on the candidate's record of teaching, scholarship, and service"). 126 The tenure-like system would, of course, need to be adapted to the specific industry in which the charitable nonprofit is engaged, taking into account professional obligations and expectations.
alternative forms of protection available to those institutions, noncompetition agreements should be considered unenforceable when used to prevent individuals from leaving one charitable nonprofit to work for another. There are two main avenues through which this goal could be accomplished: state legislatures could amend the statutes currently governing noncompetition agreements, or Congress could issue a federal mandate. 127 While the first option maintains continuity with the current legal framework, the second option-a federal statute-would be the most efficient choice and would provide the highest level of uniformity in the law.
As discussed above, the validity of employee noncompetition agreements is governed primarily by state statute.
128 Thus, incorporating a provision that renders unenforceable specific types of noncompetition agreements would fit seamlessly into the current system. However, states' legislative processes can take years and would require the mobilization of lobbyists and supporters in each state to put the process in action.
129 Moreover, even assuming a similar bill was introduced and supported in each state (in actuality, it is likely that the language would not be uniform), the various states' legislative processes move at different speeds and would produce results at varying times. 129 See Hayden, supra note 126, at 58-59 (describing "state-by-state change in the law" as "a glacial process"). For example, a brief overview of the legislative process in Minnesota (the Author's home state) is as follows: an individual or organization proposes a law and finds a legislator to sponsor the law, the legislative staff translates the idea into proper form, the proposed law (now a "bill") is introduced to the House and Senate and referred to one or more committees, the committee members discuss the bill and invite public comment, the committees vote on the bill, bills that are approved by the committees move to the full bodies for a vote, and, finally, bills that pass both the House and the Senate go to the governor for approval. would compound the frustration already felt by multi-state employers who must deal with the current state of non-uniformity among the jurisdictions in which they do business.
131
The more prudent course of action would be for Congress to speak out. Use of a federal law would ensure uniformity and eliminate the confusion that currently surrounds the various state laws, thereby putting all charitable nonprofits on an even playing field regarding this issue. Moreover, the process for enacting the law would be comparatively easy, 132 as would enforcement-to the extent the federal law conflicted with a state's law governing noncompetition agreements, the federal law would control. GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 accordance with their missions. Without a law like this in place, charitable nonprofits will be able to continue enjoying the best of both the for-profit and nonprofit worlds.
CONCLUSION " [T] he business of contributing to the public good . . .
[is] arguably the primary principle that motivates the nonprofit enterprise," 136 thereby greatly differentiating such entities from their for-profit counterparts. That is especially true in the case of the charitable nonprofit. In return, charitable nonprofits receive billions of dollars worth of tax exemptions from the government and donations from individuals that allow them to stay in business while pursuing their altruistic missions. Thus, charitable nonprofit organizations operate in a non-traditional competitive environment that rewards good deeds, albeit at a "considerable social cost."
137
Despite their unique situation and the benefits already bestowed upon them, charitable nonprofits have the ability to use noncompetition agreements to their advantage in the marketplace. Noncompetition agreements, which prevent employees from leaving one entity to work for another in a similar capacity for a certain period of time after termination of employment, are borne out of a desire to maximize profits and prevent competition in a traditional competitive environment. They should not be used in the non-traditional competitive environment inhabited by charitable nonprofits. Rather, allowing one charitable nonprofit to prevent a former employee from working for another charitable nonprofit is contrary to the charitable nonprofit's mission and tax-exempt status. Moreover, alternative and less intrusive means of protecting an employer's interests exist. Thus, Congress should enact a law rendering noncompetition agreements unenforceable to the extent they are used to prevent employee mobility between charitable nonprofit organizations.
